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Global Risks Report 2020

  • Preface
  • Executive Summary
  • Global Risks 2020: An Unsettled World
  • The Fraying Fundamentals
  • A Decade Left
  • Save the Axolotl
  • Wild Wide Web
  • False Positive
  • Methodology
  • Acknowledgements
  • Survey Results
    • The Global Risks Landscape 2020
    • The Global Risks Interconnections Map 2020
    • The Global Shapers Risk Landscape 2020
    • Risks for Doing Business 2019
  • Blogs and Opinions
  • Shareable Infographics
  • Press Release
Home
Home
Home
  • Report Home
  • Preface
  • Executive Summary
  • Global Risks 2020: An Unsettled World
  • The Fraying Fundamentals
  • A Decade Left
  • Save the Axolotl
  • Wild Wide Web
  • False Positive
  • Methodology
  • Acknowledgements
  • Survey Results
    • The Global Risks Landscape 2020
    • The Global Risks Interconnections Map 2020
    • The Global Shapers Risk Landscape 2020
    • Risks for Doing Business 2019
  • Blogs and Opinions
  • Shareable Infographics
  • Press Release

Wild Wide Web

Consequences of Digital Fragmentation

REUTERS/Tomas Bravo

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Heightened geopolitical tensions discussed in previous chapters also risk negatively influencing the huge economic potential of the next generation of technologies. The current lack of global technology governance and the presence of cybersecurity blind spots increase the risk of a fragmented cyberspace and competing technology regulations. This chapter contemplates how a fragmented cyberspace and differing technological standards could hinder economic growth, exacerbate geopolitical rivalries and further divide societies.

The 4IR: The new economy

More than 50% of the world’s population is now online;1 roughly one million more people join the internet each day.2 Two-thirds of humanity own a mobile device.3 Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies are already bringing tremendous economic and societal benefits to much of the global population.

The next wave of 4IR technologies will dramatically reshape economies and societies. Precision medicine, autonomous vehicles and drones are all fast-growing markets (see Figure 5.1), while artificial intelligence (AI) alone is expected to boost global growth by 14% by 2030.4

Sources: Cloud computing: https://www.researchcosmos.com/reports/cloud-computing-market/92916729; Precision medicine: https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/08/22/1905339/0/en/Global-Precision-Medicine-Market-Expected-To-Reach-over-USD-86-25-Billion-By-2025-Zion-Market-Research.html; Drones: https://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/vx2jd5/global_unmanned?w=5; Autonomous cars: https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/autonomous-car-market-value-at-expected-to-reach-usd-41639-billion-by-2025-cagr-412-2019-07-26?mod=mw_quote_news

Smart technologies have enormous potential to improve both human life and the health of the planet. For example, satellite-based applications can aid rural farmers to irrigate their crops efficiently.5 Prostheses can be 3D printed.6 Autonomous vehicles can be employed by the elderly to support better mobility.7 The Internet of Things (IoT) can even help to lower CO2 emissions by optimizing energy consumption and reducing traffic congestion.8

However, many unintended consequences have also surfaced. Cyberattacks have become a common hazard for individuals and businesses: our surveys rank them as the seventh most likely and eighth most impactful risk, and the second most concerning risk for doing business globally over the next 10 years (see Figure II, The Global Risks Landscape). Fifth generation (5G) networks, quantum computing and AI are creating not only opportunities but also new threats of their own. The lack of a global governance framework for technology risks fragmenting cyberspace, which could deter economic growth, aggravate geopolitical rivalries and widen divisions within societies.

The dangers of digital innovation

Cyberattacks. The digital nature of 4IR technologies makes them intrinsically vulnerable to cyberattacks that can take a multitude of forms—from data theft and ransomware to the overtaking of systems with potentially large-scale harmful consequences. Operational technologies are at increased risk because cyberattacks could cause more traditional, kinetic impacts as technology is being extended into the physical world, creating a cyber-physical system. However, using “security-by-design” principles to integrate cybersecurity features into new products is still secondary to getting products quickly out into the market.

Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure—rated the fifth top risk in 2020 by our expert network—have become the new normal across sectors such as energy,9 healthcare,10 and transportation.11 Such attacks have even affected entire cities.12 Public and private sectors alike are at risk of being held hostage. Organized cybercrime entities are joining forces,13 and their likelihood of detection and prosecution is estimated to be as low as 0.05% in the United States.14 Cybercrime-as-a-service is also a growing business model, as the increasing sophistication of tools on the Darknet makes malicious services more affordable and easily accessible for anyone.

The IoT is also amplifying the potential cyberattack surface. It is estimated that there are already over 21 billion IoT devices worldwide,15 and their number will double by 2025.16 Attacks on IoT devices increased by more than 300% in the first half of 2019, while in September 2019,17 IoTs were used to take down Wikipedia through classic distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks,18 and the risk of IoT devices being used as intermediaries is expected to increase.19 In 2021, according to Cybersecurity Ventures, cybercrime damages might reach US$6 trillion20— what would be equivalent to the GDP of the world’s third largest economy.21

Vulnerable data. 4IR technologies run on data, making privacy a major challenge. IoT devices collect and share data that are potentially highly sensitive for individuals, companies and states, from personal identification and medical records to national security information. The data brokering market—aggregating, disaggregating, copying, searching and selling data for commercial purposes—is worth an estimated US$200 billion a year.22 Data theft can enable the manipulation of individual and collective behaviour, leading to physical and psychological harm.

Artificial intelligence (AI). AI has been dubbed both “the most impactful invention” and our “biggest existential threat”.23 Indeed, we may not even be able to comprehend AI’s full potential—or its full risk. Some risks—such as manipulation through fake news and “deepfakes”—are well known.24 Others are yet to be fully uncovered, including in such areas as brain-computer interfaces and hyper-automation (combining robotics and AI).25

Fifth generation (5G). 4IR technologies rely on high-speed digital infrastructure—on 5G networks and, further down the road, 6G.26 While 5G technology can be built in part on existing 4G infrastructure, significant shortfalls in capacity are expected as early as 2020 in some countries.27 Current projections show the risk of a US$1 trillion global gap in telecommunication infrastructure investments through 2040.28 In developed countries, the challenge is not only to build modern infrastructure but also to overcome reliance on legacy systems, on which the public and private sectors currently spend up to 80% of their technology budgets. Here, introducing new, safe and reliable systems into existing capabilities is key; some entities have already begun to do this.29

Quantum computing. Quantum computing could dramatically reduce the time needed to solve the mathematical problems on which encryption techniques currently rely—from months to minutes and seconds.30 It risks rendering useless most of our existing data security and critical infrastructure systems, including military networks, email and power grids.31

Cloud computing. While many technical advancements of 4IR are essentially digitally based, cloud computing has the potential to enhance trans-sectoral development, expand technological access to remote areas and further link AI to other 4IR technologies. At the same time, with increasingly more data hosted in the cloud, companies are amassing personal information like never before, which could ultimately create potential new data privacy and security risks.32

REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

The importance of global tech and cyber governance

Attempts to address the security challenges of 4IR technologies are maturing, but they are often still fragmented and limited in scope and participants. Numerous initiatives bring together businesses and governments to build trust, promote security in cyberspace, assess the impact of cyberattacks and assist victims.33 Multilateral efforts, such as the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention, also aim to define responsible behaviour in cyberspace and harmonize the patchwork of existing laws and regulations.34 Collaborative incident response and information-sharing efforts attempt to centralize cybersecurity capabilities to reduce the impact of cyberattacks.35

International efforts to develop AI standards are also ongoing (for example, in the field of AI and ethics alone, there are over 80 frameworks),36 yet the large increase in such initiatives serves to fragment the response to the threat, often imposing burdensome and sometimes conflicting obligations on organizations operating across national boundaries. The proliferation of standards also makes it more difficult for countries and companies to converge on a single one as more AI-enabled systems are adopted.

Even more critical, international and national policies are not keeping up with technological advances. The need is urgent for a more comprehensive, inclusive and agile global governance architecture to address the dynamic and intertwined security issues raised by the 4IR. The “age of digital interdependence” will benefit all societies only if the wide-ranging geopolitical, economic and societal risks it could bring are managed in a coordinated and inclusive way.37 The current disruption of the multilateral system (see Chapter 1, Global Risks 2020) renders the development of such a framework more challenging.

Geopolitical risks

Digital innovation is both influencing and being influenced by geopolitical tension, which amplifies the possibility for risk and minimizes the chances for cooperation. At the same time, the private sector exercises significant power to impact outcomes in this realm. Indeed, global tech companies have leveraged open digital borders to integrate global supply chains and connect people worldwide—but these companies are also challenging some core competencies of nation states, such as standard-setting and monetary policies. Technological predominance and future national competitiveness go hand in hand. The lack of a global tech governance framework increases business influence on standard-setting, the foreign participation in national critical infrastructure, foreign acquisition of domestic technology, the offshoring of data, and technology transfer as a price to access foreign markets,38 influencing societal risks as well (see below). Additional risks for states include:

Parallel cyberspace. Connectivity depends on internationally established protocols. Historically, multilateral stakeholders have tended to favour a fairly open and loosely regulated cyberspace. However, current international developments point to an increased risk of divergence in protocols—old and new—that could lead to fragmentation of cyberspace and future technologies.39 Additionally, if countries continue to seek “cyber-sovereignty”—national or regional versions of the internet40—global interconnectivity could be further disrupted.

First-mover advantage. Patents in 4IR technologies are being filed at an increasing rate.41 Governments as well as businesses want to be at the forefront of cutting-edge technologies because they stand to benefit from being the first to make breakthroughs. First-mover advantage can shift geopolitical balance by influencing standards, systems and production chains.

A new digital arms race. Digital dependency is changing the nature of international and national security, raising three urgent issues: how to protect critical infrastructure, uphold societal values and prevent the escalation of state-on-state conflicts. Digital technologies increasingly feature in asymmetric warfare, enabling attacks by smaller countries and non-state actors on larger states. Viruses developed as cyberweapons have been re-purposed by adversaries after being released into cyberspace. Cyberspace has become an extension of the military domain, triggering new technological arms races.42

In 2019, several countries agreed to pursue the establishment of guiding principles for the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems.43 However, key military powers are resisting international legal regulation in this area, increasing the risk of serious future mishaps.

Interruption of international interconnectivity. Increased intelligence-sharing between government cybersecurity agencies and infrastructure operators has strengthened the appreciation of challenges related to cyberattacks and improved preparedness efforts. It has also raised the question of whether the participants in critical information infrastructure are trustworthy. The fragmentation of cyberspace will render those efforts moot and create possibly insurmountable technological incompatibilities for law enforcement to cooperate across varying systems.

Economic risks

It is no surprise that technology hardware supply chains have driven recent research and development (R&D) and trade debates between major global economies.44 Many countries are heavily scrutinizing investment in—or acquisition of—technology companies by foreign investors. Countries are increasingly looking at foreign investment in universities to assess risks of intellectual property—in the form of research and its potential commercial applications—vanishing abroad. Technology transfers in exchange for market access have become a contested part of trade negotiations.

These issues highlight the trade-offs countries are making between near-term economic gain at a time of slow growth and longer-term security in an increasingly challenging geopolitical context. Europe’s desire for its own cloud—in part to retain valuable data now being extracted by foreign players—risks it falling behind in this global race. Other economic risks include:

Fragmentation costs. In today’s hyperconnected global economy, it is estimated that a total shutdown of the internet would result in a daily GDP loss of 1.9% in a high-connectivity country and 0.4% in a low-connectivity country.45 Fragmentation of cyberspace and technologies could aggravate these economic consequences by having negative effects on businesses’ use of cloud services,46 increased transactional costs of doing business across parallel jurisdictions and lower productivity by requiring different production lines for different markets. These economic consequences undermine businesses’ ability to realize the potential of 4IR technologies.

Loss of sustainability. As the world is on the brink of climate collapse (see Chapter 3, A Decade Left), the necessary duplication of efforts for overcoming such technical fragmentation would not only be economically counterproductive, but also environmentally inefficient. This inefficiency is further amplified by countries’ pursuit of isolated national technology regulations. Adaptation to different products for different markets would inevitably increase the negative environmental footprint of any industry. At the same time, today’s ecological footprint of mass data generated for and by AI—for example, the energy required to run servers—is already considerable.47

Monetary and fiscal risks. The lack of coordinated efforts by nations on how to capture wealth created by open trade and through digital means is a major challenge, creating disparities with local companies and between countries. Moreover, new digital currencies operating outside a clear regulatory framework could undermine sovereign currencies and international cooperation against money laundering. Collapse in confidence in digital currencies could also threaten financial stability.48 At the same time, innovation in this space could provide social benefit but this requires, as then-IMF Chair Christine Lagarde warned, “being alert to risks in terms of financial stability, privacy or criminal activities, and ensuring appropriate regulation is in place to steer technology toward the public good.”49

REUTERS/Benoit Tessier

Societal risks

The differential speed of 4IR developments around the world risks widening divides between nations. Highly digitized economies have the capacities and capital to invest in future technologies, leaving behind others—especially in Africa, ASEAN and Latin America—that currently trail in areas such as patents, IoT development and market capitalization.50 Societal risks include:

Digital divide and wealth gaps. A widening digital divide between countries risks a vicious cycle, as increasing wealth gaps and a brain drain make it harder for those left behind to catch up, and easier for regions to miss critical investment opportunities that would allow access to new 4IR technology markets. Hence, countries could lose out on the compounding effect of investments and subsequently lack the R&D capabilities needed to thrive, contributing to yet further brain drain. Within countries, wealth gaps could also increase: automation is forecasted to hit low-skilled workers and women the hardest.51 Societal divides could also widen between rural and urban areas in developing economies,52 and between smart and non-smart cities in developed countries.53 The wide-scale affordability of new technologies will be one important factor for minimizing the digital divide.54

A human dystopia. Given the growing societal awareness of problems such as biased algorithms and cyberbullying,55 there are many calls for deeper engagement on questions of ethics in the development and use of 4IR technologies.56 Due diligence must be applied to avoid negative consequences for under-represented communities. The lack of a global technological framework could lead to a dystopia involving, for example, cyberbullying without consequences, workplace surveillance and the erosion of employee privacy.57

While the open cyberspace has allowed the democratization of certain processes and increased access to information and data, growing opportunities for promoting falsehoods (accidentally and deliberately) have resulted in a gradual erosion of trust in media, social networks and even governments.

Data are increasingly being collected on citizens by government and business alike, and these data are then monetized and used to refine the development and deployment of new technologies back towards these citizens, as consumers. Amassing of data by a handful of small entities leads to a further entrenchment of gaps between advanced and emerging economies.

Global governance challenges for businesses

Businesses, just as economies, rely on concerted global technology governance. Fragmentation and incompatibility between global cybersecurity and technology frameworks risk weakening businesses’ capabilities to adapt to the emerging challenges discussed in this chapter in a timely way, as raising transactional costs increases the financial burden on businesses.

More and more firms operate in complex, global and digital service ecosystems that not only expose them to their own cyber and technological weaknesses, but also to those of other participants—including customers, suppliers and managed system providers. At the same time, businesses are facing the challenge of implementing existing cybersecurity and 4IR standards (where they exist), while ensuring compliance with fragmented regulations on accountability, transparency, bias and privacy for developing—or simply applying—4IR technologies. Because government and corporate leaders equally share the responsibility for promoting global cybersecurity and digital trust, cooperation between the public and private sectors is more vital than ever in areas such as information-sharing, collaboration with law enforcement agencies, and skill and capacity development.

The new digital geopolitical race (see Chapter 1, Global Risks 2020) also risks affecting businesses’ development of 4IR technologies and their market readiness to harness the benefits of the 4IR transformation. An open and interconnected cyberspace, along with global technological compatibility, are essential for businesses to be able to counter the dislocating impacts of social media, the economic impacts of global technology giants and potential security issues resulting from the digital technology race between the world’s leading economies. By advocating for fair and concerted global actions on any 4IR-related governance frameworks, businesses can mitigate risks, ensure trust towards consumers and governments, and increasingly benefit from the 4IR.

1
1 ITU (International Telecommunication Union). 2019. Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2019. Geneva: ITU. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/FactsFigures2019.pdf
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2 Kemp, S. 2019. “Digital 2019: Global Digital Overview”. Datareportal. https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-global-digital-overview
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3 Turner, A. 2019. “How Many Phones Are in the World?” Bankmycell. https://www.bankmycell.com/blog/how-many-phones-are-in-the-world
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4 PwC. 2019. “Sizing the Prize. What’s the Real Value of AI for Your Business and How Can You Capitalise?” https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/analytics/assets/pwc-ai-analysis-sizing-the-prize-report.pdf
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5 Patel, K. 2018. “Smart Phones Bring Smart Irrigation”. NASA Earth Observatory. https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/92903/smart-phones-bring-smart-irrigation
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6 Amputee Coalition. 2019. “3D Printed Prosthetics, Where Are We Today”. Amputee Coalition Blog post, 08 February 2019. https://www.amputee-coalition.org/3d-printed-prosthetics/
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7 Chapman, M. M. 2019. “Self-Driving Cars Could Be Boon for Aged, After Initial Hurdles”. The New York Times. 23 March 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/automobiles/wheels/self-driving-cars-elderly.html
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8 Roberts, D. 2019. “Smarter Cities Will be More Efficient Cities”. Forbes Council post, 22 November 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/11/22/smarter-cities-will-be-more-efficient-cities/#3bd950332128
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9 Siemens and Ponemon Institute. 2019. Caught in the Crosshairs: Are Utilities Keeping Up with the Industrial Cyber Threat? Houston: Siemens Gas and Power. https://assets.new.siemens.com/siemens/assets/api/uuid:35089d45-e1c2-4b8b-b4e9-7ce8cae81eaa/version:1572434569/siemens-cybersecurity.pdf
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10 Muresan, R. 2019. “Healthcare Continues to Be Prime Target for Cyber Attacks”. Bitdefender Business Insights Blog post. 07 January 2019. https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/healthcare-prime-target-for-cyber-attacks
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11 Palmer, D. 2019. “Hackers Target Transportation and Shipping Companies in new Trojan Malware Campaign”. ZDNet. 23 September 2019. https://www.zdnet.com/article/hackers-target-transportation-and-shipping-industries-in-new-trojan-malware-campaign/
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12 Chokshi, N. 2019. “Hackers Are Holding Baltimore Hostage: How They Struck and What’s Next”. The New York Times. 22 May 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/us/baltimore-ransomware.html
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13 Keesem, L. 2019. “The Business of Organized Cybercrime: Rising Intergang Collaboration in 2018”. SecurityIntelligence. 20 March 2019. https://securityintelligence.com/the-business-of-organized-cybercrime-rising-intergang-collaboration-in-2018/
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14 Eoyang, M., A. Peters, I. Mehta and B. Gaskew. 2018. To Catch a Hacker: Toward a Comprehensive Strategy to Identify, Pursue, and Punish Malicious Cyber Actors. Third Way. 29 October 2018. https://www.thirdway.org/report/to-catch-a-hacker-toward-a-comprehensive-strategy-to-identify-pursue-and-punish-malicious-cyber-actors
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15 Gartner. 2017. Leading the IoT: Gartner Insights on How to Lead in a Connected World. https://www.gartner.com/imagesrv/books/iot/iotEbook_digital.pdf (page 2).
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16 IDC (International Data Corporation). 2019. “The Growth in Connected IoT Devices Is Expected to Generate 79.4ZB of Data in 2025, According to a New IDC Forecast”. IDC. 18 June 2019. https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS45213219
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17 Doffman, Z. 2019. “Cyberattacks on IoT Devices Surge 300% in 2019, ‘Measured in Billions’, Report Claims”. Forbes. 14 Sept. 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/09/14/dangerous-cyberattacks-on-iot-devices-up-300-in-2019-now-rampant-report-claims/#45642d105892
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18 Venkat, A. 2019. “Wikipedia Investigates DDoS Attack”. Bankinfosecurity.com, Information Security Media Group (ISMG). 09 September 2019. https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/wikipedia-investigates-ddos-attack-a-13049
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19 Collard, A. 2019. “Large-Scale IoT Attack Coming”. Gadget. 6 December 2019. https://gadget.co.za/large-scale-iot-attack-coming/
20
20 Morgan, S. 2018. “Global Cybercrime Damages Predicted To Reach $6 Trillion Annually By 2021”. Cybersecurity Ventures Cybercrime Magazine. 7 December 2018.
https://cybersecurityventures.com/cybercrime-damages-6-trillion-by-2021/
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21 World Bank Open Data. 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true, accessed 
1 December 2019.
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22 WebFX. 2015. “What Are Data Brokers – And What Is Your Data Worth?”. FX Blog post. April 2015. https://www.webfx.com/blog/general/what-are-data-brokers-and-what-is-your-data-worth-infographic/
23
23 Smith, B. 2019. “The combustion engine was the most impactful invention regarding the economy. Today, it could be compared with the impact of artificial intelligence”. Microsoft Portugal (@PTMicrosoft) citing Brad Smith (@BradSmi #WebSummit”, 05 November 2019. https://twitter.com/PTMicrosoft/status/1191748602554650625; Clifford, C. 2019. “Elon Musk: ‘Mark My Words – A.I. Is Far More Dangerous Than Nukes’”. CNBC. 13 March 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/13/elon-musk-at-sxsw-a-i-is-more-dangerous-than-nuclear-weapons.html
24
24 Metz, C. “Internet Companies Prepare to Fight the ‘Deepfake’ Future”. The New York Times. 24 November 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/technology/tech-companies-deepfakes.html
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25 Saha, S., K. A. Mamun, K. Ahmed, R. Mostafa, G. R. Naik, A. Khandoker, S. Darvishi and M. Baumert. 2017. “Progress in Brain Computer Interfaces: Challenges and Trends”. https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1901/1901.03442.pdf
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26 Li, J. 2019. “Forget about 5G, China Has Kicked Off Its Development of 6G”. Quartz. 07 November 2019. https://qz.com/1743790/forget-5g-china-begins-development-of-6g/
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27 Grijpink, F., A. Ménard, H. Sigurdson and N. Vucevic. 2018. “The Road to 5G: The Inevitable Growth of Infrastructure Cost”. McKinsey. February 2018. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-and-telecommunications/our-insights/the-road-to-5g-the-inevitable-growth-of-infrastructure-cost
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28 Global Infrastructure Hub. 2019. Investment forecasts for Telecommunications. Global Infrastructure Outlook. https://outlook.gihub.org/sectors/telecommunication
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29 Miller, J. 2018. “Spending on Legacy IT Continues to Grow, But There Is Light at the End of the Tunnel”. Federal News Network. 17 August 2018. https://federalnewsnetwork.com/ask-the-cio/2018/08/spending-on-legacy-it-continues-to-grow-but-there-is-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel/; Bobeldijk, Y. 2017. “Banks Face Spiralling Costs from 50-Year-Old IT”. Financial News. 02 October 2017. https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/banks-face-spiraling-costs-from-archaic-it-20170912
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30 Gibney, E. 2019. “Hello Quantum World! Google Publishes Landmark Quantum Supremacy Claim”. Nature. 23 October 2019. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03213-z
31
31 Herman, A. and I. Friedson. 2018. Quantum Computing: How to Address the National Security Risk. Washington, DC: Hudson Institute. April 2018. https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/Quantum18FINAL4.pdf
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32 Smith, Z. 2019. “Can Big Money Crack Big Tech? The New Trends Threatening Today’s Digital Giants”. Observer. 05 October 2019. https://observer.com/2019/10/amazon-google-microsoft-cloud-computing-big-tech-big-money/
33
33 See the IGF (Internet Governance Forum) for a discussion of The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace; the Cybersecurity Tech Accord; the Charter of Trust for a secure digital world; the Global Commission on Stability in Cyberspace, and the Global Cyber Alliance. See also the home page of the CyberPeace Institute, https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/
34
34 Other examples include the UN’s Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) and the new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. Organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union, the World Bank and Interpol have also developed technology and security measures.

Efforts have been led by regional organizations as well, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Organization of American States.

See also recommendation 4 in United Nations. 2019. The Age of Digital Interdependence: Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. June 2019. https://digitalcooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/DigitalCooperation-report-web-FINAL-1.pdf
35
35 Examples include the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), the Cyber Threat Alliance and the Cyber Defense Alliance.
36
36 Cihon, P. 2019. Technical Report: Standards for AI Governance: International Standards to Enable Goal Coordination in AI Research & Development. Oxford: Center for Governance of AI Future of Humanity Institute. April 2019. https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Standards_-FHI-Technical-Report.pdf
37
37 United Nations. 2019. Op. cit.
38
38 McDonald, J. 2019. “China Promises No Forced Tech Transfers, Access to Finance”. Associated Press. 29 October 2019. https://apnews.com/5dcec36663324b34b290f3f7f378c6f3
39
39 Waters, R. 2019. “No End in Sight to Split Internet Say Researchers”. Financial Times. 20 February 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/69f97e7e-34a3-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5
40
40 Stanek, R. 2019. “Four Steps to Help Prepare for an Increasingly Balkanized Internet”. 07 November 2019. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/11/07/four-steps-to-help-prepare-for-an-increasingly-balkanized-internet/#7a8589086755; Russia Today. 2019. “Russia to Launch ‘Independent Internet’ for BRICS Nations – Report”. Russia Today. 28 November 2017. https://www.rt.com/russia/411156-russia-to-launch-independent-internet/
41
41 KTU (Kaunas University of Technology). 2019. “Patent Filings around the World: Can Lithuania Compete?” KTU News. 23 October 2019. https://en.ktu.edu/news/patent-filings-around-the-world-can-lithuania-compete/; Benassi, M., E. Grinza and F. Rentocchini. 2019. “The Rush for Patents in the Fourth Industrial Revolution: An Exploration of Patenting Activity at the European Patent Office”. SPRU Working Papers Series, SWPS 2019-12 (June). Sussex: University of Sussex Business School. https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=2019-12-swps-benassi-et-al.pdf&site=25
42
42 Tao, A. L. 2019. “Black Hat Asia 2019: Get Ready for the Cyber Arms Race”. ComputerWeekly.com. 02 April 2019. https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252460807/Black-Hat-Asia-2019-Get-ready-for-the-cyber-arms-race
43
43 CCW (Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects). CCW, Final Report of the 2019 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW (advance version), CCW/MSP/2019/CRP.2/Rev.1., 15 November 2019. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/815F8EE33B64DADDC12584B7004CF3A4/$file/CCW+MSP+2019+CRP.2+Rev+1.pdf
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44 Markman, J. 2019. “Trade War with China Will Hit U.S. Tech Companies Hard”. Forbes. 30 September 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmarkman/2019/09/30/trade-war-with-china-will-hit-u-s-tech-companies-hard/#7621e04c6cca
45
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