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  • [ — Divider — ]
  • Preface
  • Chapter 1.1 Reaching Beyond the New Normal: Findings from the Global Competitiveness Index 2015–2016
    • Introduction
    • Methodology
    • The Global Competitiveness Index 2015–2016
    • Results overview
    • Country highlights
    • Conclusions
    • References
    • Box 1: The Inclusive Growth and Development Report
    • Box 2: The Case for Trade and Competitiveness
    • Box 3: The most problematic factors for doing business: Impacts of the global crisis
    • Box 4: China’s new normal
    • Appendix: Methodology and Computation of the Global Competitiveness Index 2015–2016
  • Chapter 1.2 Drivers of Long-Run Prosperity: Laying the Foundations for an Updated Global Competitiveness Index
    • Introduction
    • What competitiveness is and why it matters
    • Institutions
    • Infrastructure and connectivity
    • Macroeconomic environment
    • Health
    • Education
    • Product and service market efficiency
    • Labor market efficiency
    • Financial market efficiency
    • Technological adoption
    • Market size
    • Ideas ecosystem
    • Ideas implementation
    • Conclusions
    • Bibliography
    • Appendix A: Measurement of Key Concepts and Preliminary Index Structure
    • Appendix B: Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 1.3 The Executive Opinion Survey: The Voice of the Business Community
    • Introduction
    • The Survey in numbers
    • Survey structure, administration, and methodology
    • Data treatment and score computation
    • Conclusions
    • Box 1: Example of a typical Survey question
    • Box 2: Insights from the Executive Opinion Survey 2015
    • Box 3: Score calculation
  • Competitiveness Practices
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Global Competitiveness Report 2015 Home
  • Report Home
  • Report Highlights
  • Competitiveness Rankings
  • Interactive Heatmap
  • Competitiveness Dataset (XLS)
  • Blogs and Opinions
  • Top 10 Infographics
  • Videos
  • Press Releases
  • [ — Divider — ]
  • Preface
  • Chapter 1.1 Reaching Beyond the New Normal: Findings from the Global Competitiveness Index 2015–2016
    • Introduction
    • Methodology
    • The Global Competitiveness Index 2015–2016
    • Results overview
    • Country highlights
    • Conclusions
    • References
    • Box 1: The Inclusive Growth and Development Report
    • Box 2: The Case for Trade and Competitiveness
    • Box 3: The most problematic factors for doing business: Impacts of the global crisis
    • Box 4: China’s new normal
    • Appendix: Methodology and Computation of the Global Competitiveness Index 2015–2016
  • Chapter 1.2 Drivers of Long-Run Prosperity: Laying the Foundations for an Updated Global Competitiveness Index
    • Introduction
    • What competitiveness is and why it matters
    • Institutions
    • Infrastructure and connectivity
    • Macroeconomic environment
    • Health
    • Education
    • Product and service market efficiency
    • Labor market efficiency
    • Financial market efficiency
    • Technological adoption
    • Market size
    • Ideas ecosystem
    • Ideas implementation
    • Conclusions
    • Bibliography
    • Appendix A: Measurement of Key Concepts and Preliminary Index Structure
    • Appendix B: Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 1.3 The Executive Opinion Survey: The Voice of the Business Community
    • Introduction
    • The Survey in numbers
    • Survey structure, administration, and methodology
    • Data treatment and score computation
    • Conclusions
    • Box 1: Example of a typical Survey question
    • Box 2: Insights from the Executive Opinion Survey 2015
    • Box 3: Score calculation
  • Competitiveness Practices
  • FAQs
  • Partner Institutes
  • Downloads
  • Competitiveness Library
  • About the Authors
  • Contact Us

Macroeconomic environment

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A stable macroeconomic environment does not drive economic growth, but it is a necessary condition to promote productivity.29 Uncertainty about the future economic outlook, associated with volatile inflation and doubts about the sustainability of public finances or recessions caused by financial crises, can dramatically reduce investments. Fischer (1993) defines a stable macroeconomic framework as being characterized by low and predictable inflation and sustainable fiscal policy,30 and shows that both these factors increase capital accumulation and productivity growth. Recent financial crises have brought to light additional factors affecting the stability of the economic environment: the composition of public finance, its dynamic interaction with the financial sector, and the detrimental effect of recessions resulting from financial meltdown.

The first ingredient for a stable macroeconomic environment is low inflation. In principle it is volatility of prices that affects productivity rather than high levels of inflation per se, but empirical research has found that in practice high levels of inflation are by nature volatile.31 When inflation is high, future prices are less certain so returns are less predictable and long-term projects become riskier, reducing the willingness of firms and investors to invest. Deflation or near-zero inflation also has negative effects on the economy: it increases the real value of debt; it may also generate unemployment, because wages remain artificially above market level; it discourages investment by increasing real interest rates; and it can lead to a self-reinforcing cycle of consumers holding back spending in expectation of further price decreases. For these reasons, most central banks target moderate and stable inflation.

The second component of macroeconomic stability is the avoidance of uncertainty about public finances.32 Such uncertainty may cause potential investors to hold back from committing to new projects,33 or to prefer short-term projects to longer-term ones that would have higher returns and more impact on productivity growth.34 The need to deal with high public debt may also diminish a government’s effective political independence, including its flexibility to pursue policies that would promote productivity-enhancing investments.35 If governments increase taxes to service the debt, this can introduce market distortions that affect productivity.36 On the other hand, if governments borrow to service the debt, they need to offer higher interest rates to compensate for perceived higher risk, which can crowd out private investment.

In addition, some studies suggest that the composition of debt may matter: Gros (2011) argues that public debt owed to foreigners is much riskier than domestic public debt, because governments cannot tax non-citizens. Debt owed in foreign currency also exposes a country to the risk that depreciating exchange rates will add to the debt burden.37 Higher interest rate spreads on foreign currency debt amplify the crowding out effect.38

With respect to foreign currency exposure, private debt can also have destabilizing effects on the economy: countries whose firms hold a large amount of foreign currency–denominated debt may run the risk of a crisis since sudden stops and currency volatility can produce a chain of private-sector defaults.39

When countries with high levels of public debt run budget deficits, this fuels perceptions of instability by indicating that unsustainable debt levels will be reached at a faster rate.40 The recent financial crisis has highlighted that concerns about the unsustainability of public debt can be self-reinforcing:41 high public debt forces up interest rates, making it more difficult for governments to service the debt, which adds to concerns about the debt’s unsustainability.

The second lesson from the recent recession is that financial crises, although originating in the financial sector, can have macroeconomic effects, generating an unstable economic outlook. Recessions associated with financial crises can harm long-term productivity through a phenomenon called hysteresis, which may explain why the global economy failed to return to previous levels of growth after the crisis.42 Financial crises cause banks to restrict credit, reducing investment and increasing unemployment.43 Before credit lines can be re-established some firms go bankrupt, losing intangible assets, while unemployed workers lose skills.

29
29 In the context of the GCI, macroeconomic stability is assessed by its impacts on productivity rather than with respect to fiscal and monetary policies that affect economic growth by supporting aggregate demand.
30
30 Fischer 1993 also mentions appropriate interest rates, appropriate and predictable real exchange rates, and a viable balance of payments. However, we believe that interest and exchange rates are partially captured by the financial development pillar and partially endogenous to fiscal policy.
31
31 The empirical evidence finds a nonlinear relationship between growth and inflation; see Fischer 1993; Little et al. 1993; Omay and Öznur Kan 2010; Ibarra and Trupkin 2011; Seleteng et al. 2013. Inflation is positively related with growth up to certain threshold, and then it becomes significantly negative after this level.
32
32 Uncertainty can either be due to the policy measures that will need to be implemented to achieve budget balance, or to a high likelihood of default.
33
33 Pindyck and Solimano 1993.
34
34 Fosu 1996; Serven 1997.
35
35 Elmendorf and Mankiw 1999.
36
36 Krugman 1988; Sachs 1989.
37
37 Hausmann et al. 2013 point out that this is because developing countries cannot borrow abroad in their own currency and sometimes cannot borrow long-term domestically. This phenomenon is referred to as “original sin” by Eichengreen et al. 2003.
38
38 Du and Schreger 2013.
39
39 Aghion et al. 2004 suggest that if domestic prices do not adjust fully to exchange rate changes, a currency depreciation driven by a rapid capital outflow (a “sudden stop”) increases the debt burden of such firms, reducing their profits and in turn their ability to invest; in the worst cases they go bankrupt.
40
40 Fischer 1993.
41
41 This is a case of “multiple equilibria,” in which the self-reinforcing cycle could also go in the other direction: if the markets expect that the government can pay, risk premium will be low and hence there will be no default (Gros 2012).
42
42 The concept of hysteresis was originally discussed by Blanchard and Summers 1986.
43
43 Franz 1990.
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